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SpECIal SECTION

The anthropology of guilt
and rapport
Moral mutuality in ethnographic fieldwork
Eric Gable, University of Mary Washington

In this article I use Clifford Geertz’s backhanded defense of Malinowski’s seeming emotional
hypocrisy—his dislike of the natives whose point of view he wished to understand—to
argue that while empathy or at least sympathy are integral components of the intimacies
of fieldwork, they are also the catalyst for the darker and usually far less openly discussed
emotions that are associated with these feelings—guilt, anger, and disgust—that are also
at play in the fieldwork encounter. Indeed these sentiments, inevitably intersubjective in
origin and expression, are intrinsic to the kind of knowledge we produce as ethnographers. I
explore how these emotions emerge from or shape conversation in the field and then inflect
subsequent analyses. I review encounters I have had with lauje of Sulawesi, Indonesia, and
Manjaco of Guinea-Bissau, and museum professionals at Monticello where my interlocutors
attempted to guide my research by enlisting my sympathy for their condition, and how
such attempts to create fields of moral mutuality inflect in often unpredictable ways my
understandings of social life in those places. My focus will be on how the fraught emotion
of guilt emerges from and shapes the experience of moral mutuality in ethnographic
encounters.
Keywords: intersubjectivity, morality, guilt, fieldwork, Sulawesi, Guinea-Bissau, Monticello.

Anthropologist as instrument
When I wish to show various audiences what anthropological fieldwork entails, I
talk about my experience of a more or less unbroken stretch of fieldwork from 1984
to 1991 but in three very different places—with nominally Muslim lauje in upland
Sulawesi, Indonesia, with politically marginalized Manjaco in rural Guinea-Bissau,
and with administrators and employees at Monticello and Colonial Williamsburg,
famous sites in america’s heritage landscape limned and shadowed by the problem
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Eric Gable.
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of american egalitarianism. I stress that the experience of difference is central to
the agenda of anthropology as a comparative discipline, for without difference
there would be no basis for arguing that different kinds of sociality lead to different
subjectivities, different moralities—in a word (or rather in a word so important to
american cultural anthropology at least), difference allows for the idea of cultures
as plural. I also stress that the experience of difference—that, in my case, lauje were
more unlike Manjaco than Manjaco were unlike americans—was felt as much as
understood, that it entailed intersubjectivity. I emphasize that I loved being with
lauje and that I often hated my time with Manjaco. I talk about how much I disliked many Manjaco I met, about how many of them disgusted me; how they made
me angry but also guilty. and I emphasize that it was because of these emotions that
I ended up “studying up” at Monticello and Williamsburg, places that also made
me angry about their duplicities and hypocrisies but never guilty about my anger.
In telling the story of why I left africa behind to take up fieldwork in american
heritage sites I always recount one encounter in particular, a brief argument I had
with a Manjaco aristocrat near the end of my stay, and I often choke on stifled tears
as I try to evoke the scene and the words he spoke. That emotion says something.
So does that compulsion to retell the story and reexperience the emotion in front
of a public. In privileging the emotions elicited by fieldwork I want to convey to my
audiences that in ethnography, the anthropologist is the instrument.
It was not until I assigned my students a book I’d written—organized at least
in part on the problem of the anthropologist as instrument (Gable 2011)—and received the first tranches of papers that I realized how much most students misunderstood me. perhaps predictably, given anthropology’s haphazard record at enlightening our audiences by trying to dislodge their preconceptions, most students
simply read my likes and dislikes as reflecting lauje or Manjaco worthiness to be
liked. Manjaco were less “good” than lauje. They were meaner, nastier; end of story. Or others reflected more deeply on the problem of fieldwork and concluded that
because I liked lauje more I learned more from them, while conversely my disgust
with (some!) Manjaco precluded my learning much from them. To these students
my disgust or my dislike of some Manjaco revealed at most my prejudices and a
prejudiced person could not really be a “good” anthropologist.
absent from almost all students reflections on my reflections on the emotions
generated in the space of ethnographic intersubjectivity was even an inkling that
such emotions, whether pleasant or unnerving, are on the one hand a product of
the encounter itself and not a litmus test of Manjaco or lauje (or my) character, and,
on the other hand, potentially equally productive of what counts as ethnographic
knowledge in anthropology (Ingold 2008).1 Those misunderstandings themselves
1. Ingold argues two points that are also salient for me in my work. One, while anthropology
might be broadly defined as “the study of people . . . what truly distinguishes anthropology is not that it is a study of at all, but a study with” that “opens our minds to other
possibilities of being (2008: 82). Two, that our interlocutors are students in introductory
classrooms. We should be with them when we construct our anthropologies (ibid.: 90).
That is why I have retained the students in the section above as part of the set up to the sections that will follow that focus on how the with implicated in fieldwork conversations and
arguments leads to a appraisal of different ways of asserting an intersubjective morality.
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and what they reveal about american middle-class mores could do with a lot of unpacking. The tendency to privilege friendliness as an ultimate intimacy is perhaps
telling, as is the tendency to be quickly judgmental about (black) Manjaco much
as many white middle-class americans find, for example, african american anger
off-putting, off-base, inappropriate.
I will leave that task of unpacking to conversations in future classrooms. Instead
I will explore what can be learned from the emotion of the fieldwork encounter
first by revisiting two classic essays in Clifford Geertz’s oeuvre, “Deep play: Notes
on the Balinese cockfight” ([1972] 1977) and “From the native’s point of view: On
the nature of anthropological understanding” (1983), that are widely cited and often criticized when the problem of ethnographic intersubjectivity is raised. Then I
will review my experiences with Manjaco, lauje, and, in an epilogue, at Monticello
where in each case my interlocutors attempted to guide my research by enlisting
my sympathy for their condition, and how such attempts to create what I would
call a sense of moral mutuality inflect in odd and often unpredictable ways my
understandings of social life in those places.2 Moral mutuality, as I am using the
catchphrase, is a fairly obvious, if also significant corollary to intersubjectivity, an
assumption that one’s interlocutor agrees or should agree on basic moral perspectives, or at least can be convinced. Such negotiations are often as not implicit, even
taken for granted, yet they work via the coproduction of emotions such as shame,
anger, and guilt. My focus will be on fraught emotion of guilt. Fieldwork, I argue, is
an intrinsically guilty act.3

No empathy, no ethnography?
In both “Deep play” (as many anthropologists have emphasized, for example,
Marcus 1997) and “From the native’s point of view,” Geertz deploys a similar rhetorical structure—a vignette very closely observed followed by a more abstract analysis
of material that really has very little to do with the vignette at all. Thus, “Notes on a
Balinese cockfight” begins with a wonderfully evoked vignette of “fellow feeling” as
Geertz and his wife flee the police along with the villagers who have participated in
an illegal cockfight, hide in what turns out to be a Brahmin priest’s house, and subsequently become the pleasant butt of villagers’ comical mimicry of their “graceless
style of running,” their “panic stricken facial expressions” (Geertz [1972] 1977: 416).
2. Moral mutuality is a phrase about which I make no claim to ownership but which I use
throughout as a motif. It is a response to my sense of what Johannes Fabian has been
doing over the decades, and this prompted by conversations and arguments I had with
him and others in the workshop, “How does anthropology know?” that Bob White and
Kiven Strohm organized in 2008. Fabian has stressed the coevalness of his african interlocutors—in a moral as well as empirical sense. When he listens to them they are, to
borrow from Ingold (see above), “people.” But, like Ingold, I continue to think it is useful
to imagine people, grouped into categories we (mis)label, as cultures or societies.
3. While I am using a psychological term the encounters I describe are not the ones of
deep, enduring, and potentially producing intimacy that Borneman (2011) addresses in
his incisive essay on “interlocution-based” (2011: 243) fieldwork.
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as Geertz sets things up, fleeing the cops with the villagers is portrayed as the catalyst for acquiring an especially remarkable kind of rapport—“a sudden and unusually complete acceptance into a society extremely difficult for outsiders to penetrate”
(416). The allusion to rapport allows Geertz the authority to then write with considerable dexterity about the finer points of cockfighting. The knowledge—the facts
about how you keep a dying cock alive, or how you bet on one to win or lose—are
all there, but the natives from whom he acquired that knowledge, not to mention the
circumstances of its acquisition, have receded into a kind of unanimous anonymity.
as Vincent Crapanzano puts it in his powerful critique (1986), Balinese “remain
cardboard figures,” “they” rather than he or she or several people.4
This same pattern is followed in what to me is Geertz’s more interesting if less
widely cited essay on ethnographic intersubjectivity—“From the native’s point of
view: On the nature of anthropological knowledge” (1983). Here he asks, “what
happens to Verstehen when Einfuhlen disappears?” (1983: 56). Geertz begins with
a backhanded defense of Malinowski’s—as revealed in his diary—occasional dislike of his subjects and the pleasure Malinowski seemed to take writing about them
in disparaging terms.5 This, according to Geertz, might be read as hypocrisy, for
how could Malinowski see things, as he demanded anthropologists must, “from the
native’s point of view” and yet be so disparaging of them?
Because Malinowski revealed the potential gap between how an anthropologist
engages with an interlocutor in public and what the anthropologist thinks of him
or her in private, Malinowski, Geertz asserted, was being excoriated by anthropologists for telling “the truth in a public place” (ibid.). Geertz, for his part, partakes of a
parallel pleasure in truth-telling by making a point of calling those people anthropologists used to refer to as informants (people most of us now call interlocutors, or
hosts or colleagues, or partners or even friends) as “natives”—a term he was bound
to know would cause at least some of his colleagues to squirm almost as much as
did Malinowski’s private deployment of “nigger” in his diary.
after this provocative beginning, Geertz makes the fairly prosaic assertion
that empathy—that feeling Malinowski asserted was at the heart of understanding
“from the native’s point of view”—was a “guild pretense” (ibid.: 59). We never really could, nor did we need to feel as our interlocutors felt to understand how they
inhabited and experienced the world. Case in point, you don’t have to believe in
magic to understand how magic works its magic. Instead of empathy, we needed
to interpret the representations they produced for themselves about themselves.
These representations, whether we collected them in offhand conversations or
4. like many, I find Crapanzano’s critique both compelling and impractical. In my work
in general I have struggled to maintain a sense of particular people in particular situations, but also want to use biography, portrait, conversation, event, and so on to make
statements about collectivities. He and she become they in such a narrative. This idea of
a they may be a “fiction” in both the total sense Crapanzano asserts and also in the more
gently celebratory way that Geertz uses the term when he reminds us that all ethnography is “fiction,” but it is the kind of fiction we supply to the collective library and that we
stop supplying at our peril.
5. That pleasure echoes for me the same pleasure I get in “revealing” how much I disliked
some Manjaco. Thus, the essay’s personal resonance.
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in more formal interviews, or overheard them in public contexts, could then be
“grasped” like a proverb, or a joke, and analyzed like a text. If fieldwork was about
gathering such materials, then emotional identification need not be a vehicle for
the work of anthropology.
To demonstrate this, Geertz returns to what for him was a well-worn path,
the theme of translation of emotional states. Geertz chooses personhood as his
example of natives “representing themselves to themselves” as glimpsed from the
native’s point of view in three very different places—Java, Bali, and Morocco. He
sketches personhood in the three disparate places in fairly abstracted terms such
as the distinctions Javanese make between “smooth” and “rough” in etiquette and
the way they associate this with a concept of “surface” and “inside” (ibid.: 61). The
abstractions amount to an indigenous psychology, albeit one that is not necessarily ever completely articulated by any one native. Except for a sentence or two
when Geertz describes a suddenly widowed Javanese man sticking to pleasantries
and smiling as he deals with the death of his wife and adds parenthetically a snippet of a conversation the man had with him—“That is what you have to do, he
said to me, ‘be smooth inside and out’” (ibid.)—he offers us nothing about the
ethnographic encounter itself when he narrates what personhood is in Java or Bali
or Morocco.
But the implication is that Geertz would not have had such conversations had
he not already acquired some measure of rapport. So his backhanded defense of
Malinowski’s seeming hypocrisy belied that he continued to assume that some
form of “rapport,” if not “fellow feeling” was essential to productive fieldwork. It is
the tool that allows you to acquire “knowledge”—which for Geertz was the systems
of symbols people used to represent “themselves to themselves and each other”
(ibid: 58). Knowledge, what you, the ethnographer seek to know about them, is
beyond empathy: “Whatever accurate, or half-accurate sense, one gets of what one’s
informants are, as the phrase goes, really like does not come from the experience
of that acceptance as such, which is a part of one’s own biography not theirs” (ibid.:
70). But this assumes that those “biographies” are separate from rather than products of ethnographic intersubjectivity, a point I will consider later.
These essays have been criticized for using rapport as a rhetorical justification
for having the authority to make otherwise unsubstantiated claims for the ethnographic knowledge one conveys to the reader (Crapanzano 1986) or blamed for
making the damaging assertion that empathy is not the heart of the ethnographic
encounter (Hollan and Throop 2012; for an extensive engagement with empathy,
see the essays in Hollan and Throop 2011). Rapport and empathy are semantically
different, one being perhaps more focused on intellect, the other on emotion; fellowship, fellow feeling. Both, however, overlap as glosses for what ostensibly happens during the best, the most fruitful, and the most significant conversations that
occur during that empirically messy activity our discipline continues to call ethnography. Indeed, one would not be wrong to say that productive ethnography
is almost always portrayed as entailing rapport or empathy, usually both. Even in
George Marcus’ critical reappraisals of fieldwork in a post-Malinowskian era in
which he wishes to substitute the idea of “complicity” (1998) or “collaboration”
(2007) for rapport, the underlying tenor of fieldwork remains the same. The conversations are essentially pleasant and therefore productive of knowledge.
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Yet, if fieldwork is essentially intersubjective, if it entails human interaction in
which the anthropologist and the interlocutor are embodied beings with feelings,
biases, needs, desires, then such a characterization should not seem so obvious, so
taken for granted. Some of the best conversations humans have are veiled arguments that seem to go nowhere, that seem to reveal the impossibility of rapport,
and therefore lead to recognitions of profound difference. This does not mean
that empathy is absent. Quite the contrary. likewise, some moments of seemingly
shared intimacy, of complicity, of cooperation, might yield less in terms of understanding than they seem to, that they feel like. But again empathy is present if less
productive than it might feel. By way of illustration, let me offer a glimpse of fieldwork in Manjaco and then among lauje.

After rapport in Manjaco
Intersubjectivity is inherently about impressions. For me Manjaco, in the royal
village-cluster or “land” of Bassarel where I resided from 1986 to 1988 always
seemed to be arguing with one another. It is perhaps unfair to make too much
of an ethnonym, but the folk wisdom on the origins of “Manjako” is telling. The
term ostensibly comes from their frequent turn of phrase “man ja ko”—“I said
something”—a phrase routinely flung at an interlocutor because he or she disagrees with you, which means that you repeat yourself, but more emphatically: “I
said . . . !” Much of my fieldwork seemed to entail witnessing and recording arguments and then later using them as narrative hooks to make larger points about
the “they” I constructed: my Manjaco. So, I wrote about the way women, for example, berated male ancestors in a confrontational style that belied easy theories
of ancestral authority, but also supported their powerful alterity (see Gable 1996).
Or I used a shouting match between recalcitrant youth and befuddled elders in
the heart of the village’s “sacred forest” to make a point about how youth make
moral claims about themselves as “other-interested,” via antagonism itself (see
Gable 2000). In writing about Manjaco in this way I imagined myself following
Geertz’s lead—via a vignette-generated narrative that leads to larger, if abstracted
discussions of personhood that are intended to unsettle because they depend on a
sense of revealed difference. Culture by contrast: because the I (or the you) is not
the “they.”
My emphasis on argument to reveal the quintessential in a Manjaco ethos—to
use the old-fashioned term Geertz refurbished—also depended on my own antagonistic experiences. Often it seemed that every time I wished to record or photograph, to visibly engage in gathering the precious raw material of “ethnography”
some interlocutor would try to thwart me. Thus, when I was about to accompany a
group of women aided by one man—the owner of a net—on a fishing expedition,
my camera hanging around my neck, and the woman began chanting at me not to
bring the camera lest the world “see their assholes exposed.” I responded loudly
that, without the camera, americans would never know how hard women worked
by contrast to men because I had plenty of good shots of men working hard in the
rice fields or tapping palms. The women relented. When they did, I felt the pleasure
of Manjaco phrases tumbling from my agile tongue: “I said!”
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Teory 4 (1): 237–258
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But really only occasionally I would get that tone right and feel that sense of belonging via verbal jousting. On some of those occasions I’d even get a compliment:
“You’re Manjaco now, Eric!”
Such antagonistic exchanges excited me, though I was usually too slow to engage much less prevail. My skirmishes were particularly exciting with one middleaged man, louis, the de facto leader of the local aristocrats, because I found him
so compelling in his hauteur. On several occasions when—as a guest of the king—I
observed aristocratic functions, he ordered me to leave when it came time for the
aristocrats to discuss their “secret business” (kakut). He always reminded me not
to make tape recordings or take photographs. He told me that he knew what was
done with such images. “In paris, I have seen them in the theater—those pictures
of africa—the people watch and laugh.”
louis was not well liked. Many people—especially the younger men in the village who were beginning to take on positions of responsibility as household heads
and so forth—complained of his arrogance and belligerence. Some enjoyed imitating his loud growl behind his back. But he was the de facto leader of the aristocrats
in Bassarel, and the question that guided my work was to find out how some aristocrats exercised and maintained their political power in a radically transformed
postcolonial world.
Guinea-Bissau had just ten years before I began fieldwork won a long and violent war of national liberation against the portuguese Salazarist regime. although
there had already been one coup before I arrived in Bassarel, the nation still had a
certain heroic aura; it was a place on the “right side of history” if one were sympathetic—and I was—to leftist views. Indeed it was my leftism, which I would define
as characterized by a Nietzschian ressentiment of the rich and powerful coupled
with a sense that the disempowered and exploited brought their fate upon themselves by admiring or otherwise accepting the rich and powerful as their betters,
their leaders, that made me at once ever so slightly hopeful about Guinea-Bissau,
and also drove my research agenda. I wanted to discover the patterns of power in
Manjaco. How did “aristocrats” who were divided into a number of “houses” or
patrilineal-property sharing groups, who competed among themselves for “titles,”
associated with wet-rice fields owned by the “land” or Manjaco polity, maintain
their positions in relationship to larger congeries of houses made up of commoners, the “hosts” in any given Manjaco land? Manjaco “lands” tended to be small in
size and population. There were dozens of Manjaco lands, each presided over by
what the portuguese came to call a “ruler” or king. Many of these, in turn, owed
their position to the “ruler of rulers,” the king of Bassarel.
among the changes the leftist government enacted was an official shift away
from traditional forms of authority that were perceived as at once holdovers of
colonialism and indigenous forms of exploitation. Chiefs and kings, who had been
given positions as intermediaries in the portuguese version of indirect rule were
stripped of those positions. Manjaco arguably were more the targets of government
acrimony than other ethnic groups. During the war for independence they were
rarely on the side of the revolutionaries. The Manjaco region remained inside the
ever shrinking portuguese zone of control until the end, and although Manjaco—
commoners and aristocrats alike—also did not actively support the portuguese effort, several aristocrats deemed to be collaborators were executed clandestinely by
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Teory 4 (1): 237–258
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the revolutionaries right after the war. a handful of others emerged as heroes from
portuguese prisons; they had ended up incarcerated because other aristocrats—
competitors for chiefdoms—had lied to the authorities that they were collaborating with “the rebels.” Yet, more than ten years after the end of the revolutionary
struggle, and ten years after they lost any official political positions in the portuguese colonial system, Manjaco aristocrats were among the richest of their peers
and many still had strong voices in village affairs.
This was in part because during the colonial era, aristocrats usually had family
members who had worked as clerks and other petty officials. Colonial-era patterns
continued into the age of national independence. The salaries from these jobs allowed the children of well-placed aristocrats to acquire a higher education and thus
even better jobs in the national government, or to invest family capital in small
business ventures such as bush-taxi and transport services or small taverns or general stores.
But more important than occupation for giving them access to wealth, aristocrats controlled large valuable wet-rice fields (which were linked to local political
titles) that they could divide into parcels and rent out to commoner families. louis
was the richest of the aristocrats in Bassarel. He owned all three of the village cantinas and he leased them to petty merchants. He also controlled the second largest
of the erstwhile “titled” fields in Bassarel.
He and the other aristocrats were often the subjects of backbiting acrimony.
Many, in fact most, were using land that according to local custom was not theirs.
They had inherited fields from their fathers that were the property of the Manjaco
kingdom—fields that traditionally had been allocated by the king to chiefs for use
only in their lifetimes. according to many of their neighbors, men like louis were,
in effect, usurpers or the sons or grandsons of usurpers, though there was little
public outcry about their violations of custom, no complaints to the government
authorities even though most of them were also technically in violation of a national
land rights law (written with Manjaco specifically in mind), which forbade individual households to “own” wet-rice fields larger than a few hectares. louis, however,
may have thought of me as a representative of that government (after all, I had gotten government permission to do my research) and, therefore as a potential snitch.
Not that I needed louis to acquire a detailed sense of aristocratic political
machinations. In the portuguese colonial archives, which were left intact and open
to researchers when they abandoned the colony in defeat, there were plenty of documents that detailed squabbles over chiefdoms. Commoners with axes to grind
furnished me with more than enough information. I was also on good terms with
the elderly and deposed king who, out of bitterness for the disrespect he felt his
erstwhile subjects (including the aristocrats) showed toward him, was more than
willing to confirm and add details to what I could glean from the commoners and
the colonial documents. From those sources combined I learned more or less what
I needed to without louis’ help. I already knew more than enough about the kinds
of chicanery that aristocratic infighting entailed; I already had a fairly detailed
sense of the structure of endemic conflict that was entailed in the relationship between aristocratic “guests” and commoner “hosts” in the Manjaco rulerships. What
I was really after was not an informant, in short—I had plenty of those—nor really an interlocutor, if one imagines an interlocutor as a counterpart in a sustained
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Teory 4 (1): 237–258
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relationship; I already had people I considered to be friends who could set me
straight about Manjaco life—people with whom I could also share palm wine and
otherwise hang out with in a relaxed way. What I wanted was something else: a
certain recognition from him that I was basically a good guy. I still felt compelled
to convince louis that what I was doing would meet his approval. largely because
of his antagonism, I enjoyed the effort of trying to get him to change his mind.
One afternoon late in my fieldwork I visited louis alone to try to explain why
I wanted to hear what the aristocrats talked about when they reviewed their business at an annual ceremony. The ceremony was to be held at the spirit shrine of the
aristocrats. For months I had been attending the far larger ceremony for the village
as a whole, and had tape-recorded the formal speeches and listened in as the villagers discussed local affairs. I wanted to compare those ceremonies to the ones the
aristocrats attended. The king had already invited me to come and bring my tape
recorder, and I could have gone without louis’ go ahead, even though I knew that
customarily it was the aristocrats and not the king who ran the ceremony. We drank
several gourds full of palm wine as we chatted, so our conversation was tinged
with the affection of shared wine. When I finally asked him outright if I could
participate while the aristocrats held their ceremony, louis pointed to some shirts
hanging on a line to dry in the courtyard. “ask me for one of those and I will give
it to you.” He then gestured toward the chickens scrabbling in the sand near our
chairs: “ask me for that and my wife will cook it for you.” But then he asked rhetorically, “In america, if I went to the White House and asked to sit with the president,
would they let me?” I answered “no,” and he explained that the same rule applied
in the village. “What you ask for I cannot give you because it is not mine. What you
ask ‘the law’ [that is, the state] cannot give you because it is not theirs.”
With those few words I felt an overwhelming sense of guilt and gave up my plan
to witness the ceremony. My reasons for attending and the knowledge I hoped to
acquire—one more bit, perhaps a telling sound bite to two, about the tense distinctions between aristocrats and commoners, suddenly seemed so petty. Who would
care really about whether or not the aristocrats in this tattered little fly spot village
in this poor country were powerful or not, or threatened or threatening? Compared
to what went on in the White House this all seemed somehow irrelevant to the
problems of power that interested me, and worse my participation in the charade
that it was significant felt cheap. I couldn’t help thinking of the comparison laura
Bohannon (Bowen 1964) drew between fieldwork in colonial africa and the work
of an ambulance-chasing lawyer. louis had made me feel like a scholarly vulture
picking at the corruptions of his society in order to nourish the cravings of mine.

A Lauje idyll deconstructed
The intense guilt I felt because of louis’ explanation for why I could not have the
kind of access I craved would not have surprised me as much as it did were it
not for the fact that before arriving in Guinea-Bissau I had spent two years doing
far more pleasant research among lauje in Sulawesi. Intersubjectivity is easy to
imagine as a kind of psychology: two people with their hang-ups conversing. But
imagine a different trajectory for ethnographic intersubjectivity. Here we focus on
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the difference between individuals as representatives of a type. My hang-ups are my
own but also ones I share with my consociates. Yours are also ones you share with
your consociates. So louis’ angry sensitivity about the way parisians “laughed” at
half-naked africans is not a feeling unique to him but a sensitivity he shares with
other africans who have spent time in Europe only to return to the village or more
specifically with other Manjaco—something a “they” in Crapanzano’s dismissive
terms also experience.
Or we might make things more complex. louis’ subject position as aristocrat
(all Manjaco aristocrats were embattled in Guinea-Bissau) makes him especially
sensitive to such slights, plus my prying. So now louis can represent or stand in for
Manjaco aristocrats. Through the alchemy of the cultural his feeling of exclusion
and his annoyance with me becomes a shared and often expressed feeling, an element of an ethos to use the old fashioned term. Ditto, of course, for me. My guilt is
the kind of guilt that is endemic to a certain group of americans. It is the pleasantly
painful shadow of the american egalitarian ethos.
But, if we apply the generic idea of intersubjectivity to the specifically ethnographic context, that is, think about ethnographic intersubjectivity, then we add
another layer to this—that intersubjectivity is on par with intertextuality. If texts
cannot be interpreted independently of the texts that surround them, prompt them,
are recalled by them, then so too with fieldwork encounters. Not only do we always
go to the field with other fieldwork accounts in our library of experiences, not only
do these texts shape how we will experience and write our experiences, but so too
will some of us have (to borrow from Geertz borrowing from Javanese) “other villages, other customs” that will prompt similar interleaving of experience and text.
Ethnographic intersubjectivity, whatever else it is, is clearly that.
If my encounters with lauje and Manjaco taught me anything, it was that one
encounter, one set of subjects, influenced how I felt about, perceived, conversed
with, another set. “My Manjaco,” that is the Manjaco I manifest in the stories I
tell about them, are a product of my lauje. When representing, as when reading,
you can’t help but be influenced by the library. My tendency on that score was
to stress contrast. lauje this, Manjaco very much that. In this way I followed,
sometimes all too self-consciously, Geertz’s lead: Java, Morocco; Bali, Java; always
contrast.
So, I doubt I would have felt the intensity of the guilt I felt with louis had I not
just spent two years in the company of the far more accommodating lauje. Just
how accommodating is revealed in their attitudes toward the tape recorder and
camera my wife and I deployed.
The lauje I studied with my then wife Jennifer Nourse (see Nourse 1996, 1999,
2002) lived in two very different communities. One community among whose inhabitants we worked was a hill or highland village that lauje counted as an ancient
core of that precolonial kingdom. This village stretched along a ridgeline about 2 to
3000 feet above the coastal plane and an arduous hike traversing a swift and frequently flooded river and then up a steep slope. Hill lauje occasionally sold garlic
or shallots or rattan to coastal merchants. But mainly they subsisted on what they
themselves could gather or grow, primarily corn, taro, and upland rice. They had a
mosque and a school. Both were run by lauje of the coast. all in all they were a sort
of periphery to a periphery—their village chief, a low-level government official,
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was also a lowlander, but he rarely visited the hills. Indeed few coastal people ever
ventured into the mountains; only the most impoverished made occasional forays
to barter dried fish or other goods for mountain crops. The steep hills and swift
river formed a natural barrier and seemed always to have had. The periphery of a
periphery was by almost any measure outside the control of the coast.
We also spent less time visiting a group of lauje who inhabited a densely packed
village along a coastal plain at the mouth of a river, among coconut palm groves
owned by outsiders. Some had farms on the hillsides upriver from the coast where
they grew enough rice, corn, or cassava to feed their families. But most depended
on meager wages they could earn working for others—harvesting coconuts and
making copra for example—usually outside of the lauje community. Their villages
formed a kind of impoverished periphery to a dusty entrepôt, Tinombo, which
was not only the seat of government but a place of commerce and education both
religious and secular. Tinombo was a fairly new town, an early-twentieth-century
Dutch-inspired settler colony composed of Indonesians from elsewhere in the archipelago—Chinese, Bugis, Mandar, Gorontalese, and so forth—in the midst of
what had once been an independent if very minor kingdom. The lauje village,
Dusunan, which lay on the opposite bank of the river from Tinombo, was the home
of the descendants of those precolonial era rulers and their aristocratic retinues.
But with colonialism and its aftermath, lauje, whether aristocrat or commoner,
had come to work for or be otherwise indebted to people they considered to be
foreigners in Tinombo. Foreigners, for example, owned most of the coconut groves.
lauje hauled copra for them. Foreigners owned most of the stores and warehouses
and trucks; and they bought and bulked the garlic and shallots lauje in the hills
grew, and the rattan lauje gathered in the forested mountains. They ran the schools
and mosques; they were the police and petty bureaucrats or national party representatives. Foreigners dictated to lauje what laws and regulations they had to
follow. Foreigners defined lauje relations to that abstraction, the state. Foreigners
also defined what it meant to be religious, to be a Muslim. lowland lauje were, in
short, a more or less disenfranchised peasant proletariat. But the aristocrats among
them remembered and in some senses wished to return to a time when they, not
foreigners, ruled the region.
Before the Dutch conquered this part of Sualwesi in the early 1900s and before
the Indonesian government inherited it from the Dutch, lauje rulers or Olongians
had presided over a kingdom that comprised the scattered hilltop communities
along the Tinombo River. The king’s court was in a village close to the river’s mouth
on the coast. although by the time we arrived the kingdom had been politically
defunct for close to eighty years, the king still hosted a community-wide curing
ceremony in which lauje recognized the awful powers of “The Center of the Sea”
to spread epidemic illness—cholera and smallpox—up from the coast and into the
mountains or to withhold rain for the mountains that came from the sea. During the ceremony the king hosted a week-long feast for the spirits of the Sea, who
manifested themselves in the bodies of the lauje women they possessed, the lauje
people of the scattered communities providing the food and sharing in the meal.
During that week the spirits, via the bodies they possessed, engaged in mock duels, chanted song-stories in foreign tongues or in lauje that laid out the origins of
the earth and its hierarchies of ethnic groups. The ceremony culminated with the
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Teory 4 (1): 237–258

Eric Gable

248

departure (or banishment) of foreign spirits and the indwelling of local spirit; and,
by redrawing the boundary between foreign and native, it ostensibly restored the
health of the king and his community. Smallpox and other plagues had been sent
back to their home in the center of the sea; lauje became at that moment an intact
community again with a ritual ruler at its center.
a couple of years before we arrived, local representatives of the Indonesian government had declared the ceremony illegal, bowing to pressure from modernizing
and fundamentalist Muslims in Tinombo who asserted that offerings to Spirits of
the Sea could not be tolerated in a community that was ostensibly Islamic. lauje
in the coastal communities reacted by threatening to not vote for the Indonesian
government’s slate of candidates in the upcoming election, and the ceremony was
again performed with the government’s official, if reluctant, blessing. Our presence
as researchers allowed these aristocrats to give voice to these pretensions. Specifically, they invited us to witness and record the community-wide curing ceremony.
Throughout the ceremony we were given every opportunity to record and photograph. We were even allowed into the most secret of spaces where the ingathering
spirits of the lauje—the lords of land and Water—held a constant vigil over a
shrine only the king and his kin would normally ever see.
We witnessed the ceremony twice. Meanwhile we lived most of the time in an
upland lauje village. There we learned that some mountain lauje looked down
at the coast and blamed their kin there for a recent inexorable ecological decline.
Once thickly forested hills were now choked with spiky grass. It rained too much
in one year, causing mudslides, stripping away the soil. In another year it rained
too little, stunting and wilting anything they planted. Once fertile fields were now
stripped of their crops by pigs rooting among the tubers, tearing down corn, trampling rice. To hill lauje this was evidence of a cosmology out of whack because their
lowland cousins had failed to maintain ritual obligations to the spirits. lowlanders,
especially some of the aristocratic ritual specialists, and increasingly those who no
longer honored local spirits but only allah, had begun selling rice and corn and
by extension had sold the essence of the land itself. as a result the lands began to
harden and the forest began to recede.
If lowland lauje sold food and therefore violated cosmological injunctions that
what “land and water” gave to humans should be given to others in turn. lauje in
the mountains asserted to us that they, by contrast, always gave food to anyone who
asked for it or who visited. Because hill lauje “gave food and never sold it” people
from distant hilltops would stop at our place on their way down the slick muddy
trail and give us taro or corn. When we would visit our neighbors’ verandas they
would invariably offer to share a meal, sometimes of rice or cornmeal and dried
fish, often some boiled bananas or taro or cassava that we would all take from a
common plate and dip into a little pile of salt and mashed hot peppers.
This routine generosity provoked in us a certain guilt-tinged desire to reciprocate. We felt the pain of our wealth and their poverty each time they shared with
us their poor meal of taro dipped in salt. We felt the pleasure of belonging each
time we ate a meal in common. So, we eagerly supplied medicine—for malaria, for
worms, for giardia, and for dysentery—when we had it and were asked for help. We
also shared with frequent visitors our supply of cigarettes and pouch of tobacco,
and our coffee laced with powdered milk and sugar. and we too cooked for others
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when they stopped on their way down or up the trail to spend some time sitting on
our veranda.
When lauje told us that they gave food and didn’t sell it, they also warned us
that it was an obligation to receive such largesse lest we offend the “sprit of hearth
and fire”—the domestic refraction of a congeries of spirits that included the spirits
of the land and Water and especially the “twins”—the spirits of the placenta and
birth fluids. Each of these spirits was portrayed as having sacrificed itself for human beings. Hearth and fire exhausted their essence so that food might be cooked.
lord of Water and land gave of itself and suffered as a result so that humans could
grow crops. The twin-siblings of humans died at birth so that a person could be
born. Humans “paid tribute” to the spirits when they were ill. Illness was a form of
repayment—suffering for suffering—yet illness remained within a certain bounds
because spirits were “poison and cure.” They caused illness but they also left human
beings alone, making them well again—that is, as long, as humans recognized the
spirits’ sacrifices by holding periodic celebrations involving the shared consumption of foods.
Eating a daily meal in common was a mundane version of such a celebration. If
you, as a guest or visitor, came to a house when a meal was being cooked, you had
to share in the meal lest “hearth and fire” were insulted at your refusal to recognize
their sacrifice. as one of our hosts explained, “even if you are not hungry, take a
bit of rice or a bit of taro and touch it to your throat.” That, he counseled, would
be enough to satisfy the spirits and ward off the effects of the sin of ampunan—a
sudden slip along a treacherous trail, or a drowning in a flash flood while fording a
steep banked stream—that horrible misfortune that occurs when you fail to accept
the largesse of “hearth and fire.” as long as we fulfilled that minimal obligation we
were safe from sanctions that the spirits, not lauje, enforced. So, lauje enjoined us
always to accept the offer of a meal or at least make the proper gesture of thanks.
It was pleasant and exciting to be encouraged to participate in an enchanted
mutuality in which one’s own travails or the world’s degradations could be blamed
on a failure to keep up a relationship human beings had with nature by recognizing
nature’s various spiritual refractions. It was also easy to project into their enchanted
sensibility an allegorical critique of capitalism’s corrosive powers, and to equate
their allegiance to the lord of Water, lord of land as local resistance to state sponsored Islam. It was also a pleasure to become their occasional allies against the state
and against Islamic fundamentalism as when we were enlisted as experts in culture
to argue for the centrality of the curing ceremonies that revolve on the Olongian
and local folkways and customs.

Conclusion
I have offered you sketches of my encounter with lauje out of temporal sequence in
order to try to disrupt what I at the time took to be an obvious difference between
the two sets of experiences. at the time my frustration with Manjaco was exacerbated by my memories of rapport with lauje. Rapport was experienced in the
chants the spirits directed at our tape recorder and ratified in those shared meals
and pouches of tobacco. among lauje access and rapport banished guilt and the
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sense of otherness that comes with guilt. By contrast, my frustrated efforts to gain
access via rapport with Manjaco like louis made me all too aware of the sources of
my guilt and of my otherness. It wasn’t until a much later visit to lauje that I realized how artificial was the contrast I was given to drawing between those encounters at least with regard to my own sense of estrangement.
When we lived in the upland lauje village our foreignness receded from our
consciousness because it was rarely remarked upon. as we shared those meals
of rice and taro with our neighbors, the children of Taipaobal’s most influential
shaman, they occasionally remarked that in times when the rice or corn or taro
were scarce they would eat a wild root crop called ondot that needed to be soaked
in water for days before it was safe to consume. Never did we eat such food when
those lauje neighbors and friends hosted us. It was always rice or taro or a porridge made of ground dried corn. But a decade after our initial visit we returned
and this time I spent two weeks alone with our erstwhile hosts, sleeping in their
hut, traveling with them. One night when we returned well after sunset from a
long journey the men asked me if I might like to try ondot. The meal was already
cooked. So a porridge of ondot it was, which tasted richly pungent. It was as we
shared this meal that I learned that my hosts often ate ondot and that they had
always (at least often) done so, even in the years we had been their neighbors.
Foreigners, lowlanders, they emphasized did not like ondot. It made lauje “shy”
to admit that they liked it, in fact craved it. So in those two years where we felt so
close to our neighbors a dozen or so yards away and just down the path, we had
been outsiders after all!
In Steven Caton’s (1999) book on David lean’s famous film “lawrence of
arabia” we are coaxed to see in lawrence’s somewhat embarrassed (but also exultantly narcissistic) effort to wear tribal clothing the dream of belonging that characterizes the desires of many anthropologists. We want to be accepted, to join in.
That desire makes us occasionally forget that they still know we are only wearing
a costume.
When I tell my students about my feeling of belonging with lauje and estrangement from Manjaco, what gets lost is not only the obvious fact that my emotions
are not a reliable barometer of the extent of my engagement with my hosts. More
importantly, guilt might have been a feeling that I shared without recognizing it
at the time with many of my Manjaco interlocutors. This awareness, if indeed it is
true, has required the passage of time, as it is mapped out so deceptively simply in
a recent book by Michael Jackson (2011). In Life within limits Jackson accompanies
an african interlocutor on a visit home. The emigrant is made to feel guilty for
leaving. That guilt keeps him tethered to his home village, makes him feel a responsibility toward those he has left behind even as he chafes and feels a certain anger at
those entanglements. The guilt and the anger are symptoms of kinship. and those
who elicit guilt are well aware that they are capitalizing on the moral mutuality that
kinship implies. When Manjaco used to compliment me by exclaiming, “You’re
Manjaco now!” I was then perhaps less aware than I am now of how quintessentially Manjaco were the lessons in moral mutuality they were teaching me, even via
off-hand and spontaneous compliments. and such lessons implied much the same
sensibility as louis depended on when he offered me his shirt, his chickens, but not
the ceremonies that the aristocrats claimed as their own.
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I often wonder how I would have experienced lauje and Manjaco had I lived
with Manjaco first (see Gottlieb 2012).6 I like to argue, and in an embodied sense
I tend to move more like a Manjaco than a lauje. like Manjaco, I make broad
gestures with my hands and arms, while lauje tend toward a closed-in reserve.
Would I have liked Manjaco better and, perhaps, have found lauje shyness offputting, rather than endearing? Had I been with Manjaco first, would I have been
more alert to the fact I never considered while with lauje: we were not considered or called out as “kin” even as we lived among lauje in “family-like” settings.
Would then, our sense that we shared a basic moral perspective, the moral mutuality of looking together at a landscape and seeing nature in need of protection
and recognition also be put into question? Would then the lack of guilt I felt have
seemed odd, given our clear material superiority? Mountain lauje often complained to us about their distant kin in the “stone houses” down below in the relatively modern and wealthy town of Tinombo. Down there, we had a stone house
too. But because lauje never explicitly linked us to them, we never felt called out
on that score. Had Manjaco taught me their lessons first, I might have been more
sensitive to lauje shyness—and seen through it, and felt far less comfortable as a
result. But I am certain that in whatever order I encountered lauje and Manjaco
I still would have become aware of the contrast—that the intersubjectivity of the
encounters, and especially the context of guilt itself, would be evidence, if you
will, of an ethos.
That is why that while I find much that resonates in Marcus’ update of Geertz’s
musings on rapport, “The uses of complicity” (1998), I am also troubled by his
dismissal of the utility of an “older” anthropology he associates with Geertz and his
era. In charting what was then an emerging trajectory of fieldwork, Marcus takes it
for granted that anthropology has become a guilty discipline and (therefore) much
more overtly political than it was in the innocent days Geertz recalls so fondly
in his essay on the Balinese cockfight. Then, Geertz could imagine himself, and
imagine his interlocutors imagining him as a potential target for the police, as both
on the same side. Now, Marcus surmises, such innocence would seem naive. Now,
when many anthropologists who did fieldwork or wrote their dissertations after
Anthropology as cultural critique train neophytes by telling stories of our disciplinary past, they are as likely to put their forbearers on the side of the police as on the
other side. Guilt requires self-flagellation—a constant wallowing in a crime while
also fleeing the scene of that crime.
In his critique of Geertz, Marcus argues that we replace the idea of rapport with
the idea of complicity. He suggests that if we recognized complicity rather than
ignoring it, we could find affinities in our social positions and the positions of
our informants in the kinds of out-of-the-way places that so charmed Geertz and
his generational peers: “What ethnographers in this changed mise-en-scène want
from subjects is . . . an articulation of the forms of anxiety that are generated by the
6. Whether first fieldwork and first love is an appropriate analogy, it produces interesting discussion because it raises the more salient question of the emotional state of the
researcher and the relationship between that state and other, if you will “relationships,”
which, if one is important enough in the discipline (e.g., Margaret Mead) can become a
topic of a secondary scholarship on fieldwork and intimacy.
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awareness of being affected by what is elsewhere . . . the ethnographer on the scene
. . . makes this sense of elsewhere present” (Marcus 1998: 119).
My encounters with louis certainly reverberate with Marcus’ analysis. To retell
the story of his refusal of my attempt at rapport over and over as a confession (and
enjoy the storm of tears) is precisely what one would expect of a guilty anthropologist. likewise my effort at gaining access from him prompted the kind of criticism from louis that makes “a sense of elsewhere present.” paris, and by extension,
my world, emerged in his argument against my prying as a place that excluded
africans via derisive laughter. But while I experienced in my encounter with louis
the “elsewhere” that ensnared us both, I also felt, through the way he performed
aristocratic privilege with me as audience and actor, the immediacy of the aristocrat-commoner divide in Bassarel itself, and in the directness of his confrontations
with me very different sensibility from the kinds of relationship that lauje created
with us. and it is in that kind of intersubjectivity that we return to the kind of anthropology Geertz championed.
Geertz drew sharp distinctions between Balinese or Javanese and Moroccans to
make a case for the existence of “local knowledge,” or “ethos,” or “culture,” in order
in part to assert that those contrasts are more profound than, say, the more pervasive kinds of contrasting anthropology is given to making between the “contemporary moment” and the past, the colonial and the postcolonial. as anthropology has
become increasingly a guilty discipline, desiring to escape its complicity in pernicious othering, it also gives up on the creativity of contrast. That is a shame because exploring contrast is anthropology’s enduring contribution to human studies
broadly conceived. Marcus and others sometimes dismiss that contribution as an
“archival function that is past or has been accomplished in an earlier era of anthropology” (Marcus 2007: 8). When one is studying bureaucrats or administrators
it can seem that no matter where one is it is all about “paraethnography.” But for
those who continue to assume that there are out-of-the-way places in which difference is important and who likewise assume that demonstrating that continues
to be of value, even at the risk of retracing a well-worn path, then Geertz’s effort
remains relevant.
Indeed it could be argued that Geertz’s agenda shares much with recent efforts
to push the envelope of intersubjectivity even further via difference and othering.
Note that just as there are other cultures, other personhoods, there may also be
other intersubjectivities. For us a common sense understanding of intersubjectivity
is that we assume when we converse with someone that we know to some degree
how they feel and think because we are alike—human—and as we converse we act
on, even embody that assumption. Our conversation therefore is already premised
on a model of the intersubjective and this model may resist or may be modified by
the conversational encounter. Such a model can be very resistant. Think here of
how Westerners talk to cats, or chickens, and imagine they are in a dialogue. Yet,
clearly anthropology has shown that there are varieties of ways of imagining what
it is like to be, feel, think human. So one can imagine an ethno-intersubjectivity, the
goal of which would be to acquire native models of the intersubjective. Some such
models, of course, would include other entities as intersubjects in ways that subvert
our common sense understandings of the intersubjective—animals, bits of nature
we tend to ignore, or technology, and so forth. Thus, the implicit exploration of
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intersubjectivity in actor-Network Theory. Thus, too, the work by anthropologists
in lowland South america (see, e.g., Mentore 2012) and in New Guinea on local
models of human-animal-spirit intersubjectivity.
Were I to engage with that emerging literature, I might begin with a contrast between Manjaco and lauje that opened up yet other differences. For lauje rice had,
in a sense, a soul. When I asked Manjaco about the agency of rice and commented
that for some people rice might have a soul, they scoffed. But to explore those differences would be a very different article. Even when one sticks only to human
intersubjectivity, I find it useful to use the conversations and the arguments I had
with Manjaco and lauje to draw distinctions in order to revisit the idea of culture.
But unlike Geertz, I worry constantly and more or less publicly that the contrasts I
draw are too sharp, too motivated by my own subjectivity—that guilt-tinged postcolonial complicity, Marcus so deftly exposed, and that John Borneman recently
called “the contemporary fantasy of equality” (Borneman 2011: 244). Yet, following
Geertz I also assume that read, or rather, narrated properly, these experiences can
be used to think about the different kinds of moral mutuality that lie, I believe, at
the heart of ethnographic intersubjectivity.

Epilogue
and there, of course, is more to Marcus and the problem or promise of intersubjectivity than that, because the purpose of his essay on “complicity” was not only
to change the mise-en-scène of fieldwork in out-of the-way places, to make that
fieldwork “multisited,” but also to remark on the then—and still very much today—tendency in anthropology to become a repatriated discipline, especially in
what Marcus called “second projects” (e.g., Marcus 1998). The guilt that defined a
postcolonial era for many anthropologists explains the more general disciplinary
trajectory Marcus charts in the essay and also pioneered in his own ethnographic
efforts: that in this last quarter century anthropologists have at once endlessly explored our collective complicity in colonialism (note, that the classics are often read
or, to be more accurate, referred to in courses devoted to this kind of auto-critique),
while also escaping the savage slot in favor of the scientist’s laboratory, the Wall
Street office, the hospital, the museum, the NGO—in short, to places where we
could “study up,” speak truth to power.
Indeed it is precisely that kind of urge that made me so amenable to louis’
refusal. Because of that conversation with louis, when I returned to the United
States I began research on Monticello (work that soon led to collaborative research
with Richard Handler on Colonial Williamsburg), a house museum associated with
Thomas Jefferson. Chastened by his remarks, my goal was to do something along
the lines louis had intimated would be impossible to do at the White House. I
wanted to discover how a public institution that was in the business of the open dissemination of knowledge about the past in a pluralist egalitarian society addressed
conflict and controversy about that past as it related to egalitarianism. among
the issues that quickly became salient were how Monticello addressed Jefferson’s
participation in the institution of slavery, his sexual relationship (at the time alleged and also heavily contested, pitting so-called experts against an increasingly
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skeptical public), with Sally Hemings, a slave, and, connected to all of this, the way
Monticello staff managed the often day-to-day encounters they had with members
of the public who they deemed culturally or intellectually inferior, but with whom
they had to enact at least the etiquette of equality.
paradoxically my initial foray into the museum world was a high watermark for
access for me. It fulfilled a desire to study up without making me complicit with the
powers that be, while also depending on an illusionary moral mutuality. I set up an
interview with the then director of Monticello about his efforts to make Monticello
a site more congenial to african americans and to therefore aid an egalitarian
project of racial reconciliation. But somewhat accidentally we also discussed the
institution’s efforts to disentangle itself from an increasingly activist fundamentalist Christian community that had become an embarrassment. at Monticello the
Fundamentalist Christians had co-opted an event—the Easter Sunrise service that
Monticello had hosted for decades but whose original justification was beyond the
pale of institutional memory. Here are excerpts of that interview and excerpts of
comments the director made when he and I subsequently reviewed the entire text
and my commentary on it line by line:
The bottom line—and this is highly sensitive—is that I don’t think the
ceremony [the Easter Sunrise service] is appropriate for Monticello. I say
that as somebody who is very active in a church, but I don’t think that
this is something in keeping with the Jefferson tradition—something
Jefferson would have done himself, something Jefferson would be
comfortable with. . . . In addition we ran into genuine logistical problems
and it was easy, basically—to be completely candid—in a public relations
sense, to say that because of the difficulties we were having that we were
going to discontinue the service. But the core, in my mind, was that it
was not an appropriate service for the Foundation to sponsor here at the
home of Thomas Jefferson. . . . I’m being more candid with you than I
hope you’d be with your audience. But we tried to present it in a way that
made sense to the community. We could have presented it in a way that
could have caused considerable controversy. . .
What we said, basically was perfectly honest. . . . We were working
with a ministerial association. and this is not to be critical of anyone, but
we were ending up with the same denominations every year. They were
having trouble getting the public address system. There was an old timer
that was prepared to do it but he was crotchety and wanted to drive the
car right up on the lawn in front of the portico. We didn’t think that was
a good idea. . . . and the ministers said, in fact, that they didn’t know if
they’d be able to pull the program together.
It’s not our program. Historically, we were just happy to make Monticello available for a program that they arranged. So, if they were having
trouble, that was enough for us. . . . [also] we had a couple of years rained
out, and we had cold weather one year. and we don’t want to be involved
in programs where people are physically unhappy.
So that was basically the explanation we gave the public, but behind
that was my own uneasiness about whether this was appropriate and I
asked . . . our director of research and she said that she certainly didn’t
think it was within her reading of Thomas Jefferson’s beliefs.
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That’s the story. Kind of a public explanation and behind that some
other real concerns . . .
. . . We tried to get the word out in advance so people would know it
wasn’t going to be held so they wouldn’t drive up and be disappointed. . . .
We got the word out through the newspapers, radio; we had ads. and I
was interviewed on television. I said basically what I told you—logistical
problems, weather and all. I don’t believe I got a call or letter from anybody. The ministers had some second thoughts when they heard that we
were prepared to stop it. They would redouble their efforts to deal with
the logistical problems. But I don’t recall getting any critical letters in the
mail. Or any positive letters. Some people personally said that it was a
good decision, that Monticello had no business doing that anymore.

When the director and I reviewed my comments on the excerpts from the interview, he wanted me to make several changes that would, he felt, clear up certain
distortions. He felt, for example, that the line “I’m being more candid with you”
should be deleted because it made it appear that he wanted me to lie to my audience. To the director, while “logistical problems” certainly had the advantage of
being a convenient excuse, more importantly it was a truth upon which all parties
concerned could agree. He did not mean, however, that the Ministerial association was an equally witting participant in this agreement. In fact, he hoped that the
ministers would accept the public explanation as genuine and not rock the boat.
When I wrote up the interview, he and I scrutinized line by line, I had summarized the events by writing that “the problem of the Easter Sunrise service was
simply a matter of reclaiming terrain that had fallen out of the Foundation’s control.”
The director was uncomfortable with the word “control” in the sentence because it
sounded “egotistical.” It was not, he reiterated, an issue of “control,” but an issue of
what was “appropriate.” He claimed that he did not feel that he or the Foundation as
a whole dictates to others what is right or proper. (Thus, for example, he emphasized
that he did not dictate to the members of the ministerial association or to the wider
public as represented, for example by the press, that they accept as apt the Foundation’s explanation for why the service had to be cancelled.) Rather, the director and
the Foundation are simply acting as gatekeepers and stewards over a landscape that
generates its own proprieties. For this reason, he wanted me to insert into the excerpt quotes from two eminent Jeffersonian scholars who had “personally said that
it was a good decision” to discontinue the service. One, he told me, had called the
ceremony an “anathema.” He wanted me to include references to these scholars to
indicate that his decision to cancel the service was not a personal decision. But he
also wanted me to keep the names of these scholars “off the record.”
That reference to keeping names “off the record” and the virtual handshake deal
between us that it implied, made me feel that the director interpolated me as a journalist of sorts and subject to the kinds of rules of thumb implied by journalism.
Throughout the interview there was also the sense that Jordan, the director, assumed
I would agree with him that the religious zealots should not have speaking rights
at Monticello. That is what his openness toward me and his befuddlement with my
characterization of what he said to me revealed. Consent in journalism is an informal
negotiation involving much the same combination of calculation and sentiment as
does our relationship with the people we talk to and live with “in the field,” but no
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formalized procedures protecting sources from the journalist’s urge to get a story.
Thus the director’s wish that I be less forthcoming with my audience than he was with
me might depend at best on shared sentiments, or, in a pinch, on the assumption that
if I wanted more information from him later I wouldn’t “burn” my source now.
For my part I was happy to burn my source—to leave, as it is left above, not only the
quote, “I’m being more candid with you,” but also the director’s name. Even though I
had no sympathy for the Christian Fundamentalists, I wrote a paper with the conversation above intact along with the comments the two of us made as we went over the
transcript together, but did not find a journal willing to publish my piece.
I am, upon reflection, not displeased with this. But nor do I feel, even today, a
shred of guilt at keeping the fingerprints in rather than erasing them as the director
wished. My interest in Monticello was never in exposing its particular duplicities
to the “public,” much less the foibles of its then current leader. Rather I wanted to
get at the inevitability of this kind of duplicity itself—how museums in modern
democracies require and routinely generate a certain delicate double-speak.
When I tell my various audiences (including students and those in the museum
world) about this later conversation and when I link it back to the conversation
I had with louis, I want them to ponder the problem of guilt in anthropological
fieldwork and whether, for example, I should feel as free from guilt in the last instance and as overwhelmed by it in the first. Thinking about what prompts guilt
gets to the essence of the ethics of anthropological fieldwork. But I also want them
to think about the fact that what I know about museum directors and Manjaco
lords is inherent in the tenure of the conversations I had with them (to borrow
from Ingold [2008]) and not in the form of knowledge I acquired after a moment of
rapport. anthropology is a guilty discipline. Guilt emerges out of moral mutuality.
Moral mutuality exemplifies ethnographic intersubjectivity.
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Anthropologie de la culpabilité et du rapport: mutualité morale dans le
travail de terrain ethnographique.
Résumé : Dans cet essai, j’utilise la défense équivoque de Clifford Geertz de l’apparente hypocrisie émotionnelle de Malinowski (son aversion des indigènes dont il
voulait comprendre le point de vue), pour soutenir que si l’empathie ou au moins la
sympathie sont parties intégrantes de l’intimité du travail de terrain, elle sont également des catalyseurs pour des émotions plus sombres, et généralement beaucoup
moins ouvertement discutées, associées aux sentiments de culpabilité, de colère et
de dégoût qui sont également en jeu dans la rencontre sur le terrain. En effet, ces
sentiments, inévitablement intersubjectifs dans leur origine comme leur expression, sont intrinsèques à la nature des connaissances que nous produisons comme
ethnographes. J’explore comment ces émotions émergent des conversations sur le
terrain et infléchissent les analyses. Je passe en revue les rencontres que j’ai eues
avec des lauje de Sulawesi, en Indonésie, des Manjaco de la Guinée-Bissau, où mes
interlocuteurs ont tenté d’orienter mes recherches en faisant appel à toute ma sympathie pour leur état, et comment ces tentatives de créer des champs de mutualité
morale ont influencé de manière souvent imprévisible mes compréhensions de la
vie sociale dans ces endroits. Dans cet article, j’insiste sur la façon dont la charge
émotionnelle de culpabilité émerge et façonne l’expérience de la mutualité morale
dans les rencontres ethnographiques.
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